ABSTRACT
Introduction
When a certain task has to be carried out in an organization several people may contribute to the success, but typically a superior will hold one person responsible for the task. But what is the exact content of the expression "holding someone responsible"? And why is it considered to be necessary to hold someone responsible in so many instances? In this paper a simple theory is provided of what responsibility means in a multi-agent career concerns framework.
To illustrate the key idea consider a situation in which a manager of a certain department delegates a certain task or project to some of her subordinates. After having observed the outcome of the project, she will most certainly adapt her opinion on the talent of all individuals who have contributed to the task. If now this manager believes that the largest part of the work has been carried out by one employee, and the project has been a success, she will adapt her opinion on this employee's talent to a larger extent than her opinion on other employees. But in many instances a high opinion by a superior will pay o¤ in the future. Due to those considerations, the employee who is believed to be contributing most, may then have indeed a higher incentive to contribute more than his colleagues. If the superior is not able to monitor the individual contributions to the task, her beliefs thus may become self-ful…lling. The larger she believes one agent's contribution to be, the stronger his reputation will be a¤ected by the outcome as "he will be held responsible"to a larger extent for the success of task. But the stronger his reputation is a¤ected, the stronger will be his incentives to work hard on the task.
When several agents can possibly contribute to the task, there will of course be a multiplicity of equilibria as the extent of each agent's contribu-2 tion is essentially a¤ected in equilibrium by the beliefs of the superior on the respective contributions. This leads to a natural notion of responsibility:
A superior holds a certain subordinate responsible for a task, when she announces her beliefs that this subordinate contributes most to this task. But, the best response of this subordinate will then be indeed to contribute more to the task than others. Hence, from this perspective the informal allocation of responsibility in organization, which typically comes along without any change in formal contracts, can be interpreted precisely as the selection of one of several equilibria.
Other authors in economics have explored di¤erent notions of responsibility. In Prendergast (1995) the responsibility of an agent is de…ned as the subset of tasks allocated to him by a manager and it is shown that rent seeking considerations lead the manager to allocate to few tasks to the agent. Manove (1997) de…nes job responsibility as the extent to which an agent's e¤ort a¤ects the principal's return and examines how wages and promotion policies are related to job responsibility.
The incentive e¤ects of career concerns have been …rst formally analyzed by Holmström (1982) . In his basic framework an agent's output is the sum of his e¤ort, his normally distributed ability which is initially unknown to all and some random component. This output is observed by potential employers on a competitive labor market who bid for the agent's services. In the unique equilibrium an agent works hard in the beginning of his career to a¤ect the market's beliefs on his ability and receive higher wage o¤ers. Dewatripont et al. (1999b) generalize Holmström's model including the possibility that an agent's talent also determines his marginal product of e¤ort. 1 In such a framework a multiplicity of equilibria arises in a single agent model.
We adopt the idea that an agent's imperfectly known talent determines his marginal product of e¤ort. But whereas in the career concerns literature incentives are typically created by a competitive labor market paying an agent a wage proportional to his expected ability, in our model incentives arise due to an internal promotion decision such as for instance in the tournament literature (compare Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) or Green and Stokey (1983) ) or more speci…c in the literature on pro-3 motions as for instance in Waldman (1990) , Prendergast (1993) Malcomson (1994) and (2001) . This seems a more natural assumption for modelling career concerns within an organization, as no perfect visibility of output to the outside labor market is necessary. In our model, two agents with imperfectly known abilities contribute e¤ort to a certain task. A principal observes the outcome of the task and can then promote one of the two agents. In contrast to the tournament literature, however, the principal cannot observe individual signals on the performance of each agent separately, but only learns the total outcome to which both agents can possibly contribute.
We will show that there are two types of equilibria in our model. On the one hand, under certain restrictions two sole-responsibility-equilibria exist in which exactly one of the two agents exerts a positive e¤ort level and is held responsible for the task. On the other hand, there is always a noresponsibility-equilibrium in which no agent contributes e¤ort but there is never an equilibrium where both agents contribute positive e¤ort levels. This result formalizes the idea that in organizations it is commonly felt that one should assign sole responsibility for a task to a unique person as has already been emphasized in the quotation above.
Note that the choice of responsibility does not encompass the allocation of a formal decision right. The principal is not able to commit ex-ante on the consequences of the outcome as this seems to be an important feature of most decision procedures within organizations: 2 When a superior announces to some employee "You are responsible for this task"this is rather an informal act. No contract is signed which is enforced by third parties. In the model we try to capture this notion of responsibility.
In this view the precise economic meaning of this sentence is that the principal announces that she believes in a large contribution of the speci…c agent to the particular task and therefore will promote this agent afterwards if the task is succesfull. If an announcement is consistent with one of the possible equilibrium strategies, the principal will indeed have an incentive to do what she announced given that the agents believe its content. In the terminology of Farrell and Rabin (1996) in their survey on cheap talk, 4 the principal's messages is therefore self-comitting: "if believed, it creates incentives for the speaker to ful…ll it" (p. 111). When the agents optimally react to this announcement of beliefs it will become self-ful…ling without any commitment. Hence, the informal act of allocating responsibility does have economic consequences.
If the principal can select one of the possible equilibria, we have to ask which one she prefers. It is straightforward to see that this will never be the no-responsibility-equilibrium. Hence, in a next step, we compare the two sole responsibility equilibria if the agents di¤er in the principal's prior expectations on their respective abilities. As we will show, there are two aspects that should be considered when determining who should be held responsible for a certain task. On the one hand, we examine the incentive aspect of responsibility and characterize which agent works harder when being responsible and which one produces a higher expected output. But a second aspect is that by allocating responsibility, the principal can learn more about the talent of the responsible agent and this will pay o¤ in the future. Hence, we also analyze who should be held responsible when this learning aspect is considered.
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In the single task model, however, an ine¢ ciency arises as at least one of the agents does never exerts any e¤ort on the task. Therefore we extend the model to encompass a second task. We show that in the extended model three types of equilibria occur: Again, there is a no-responsibility equilibrium in which neither of the agents exerts any e¤ort. Second, there is a continuum of sole responsibility equilibria, in which a single agent works for both tasks. But …nally, there are equilibria in which each agent is responsible for a di¤erent task. In this equilibrium both agents compete in a tournament structure each one by exerting e¤ort on the task for which he is held responsible. We show that with this alloaction of responsibility on separate tasks, the principal may well be able to achieve …rst-best incentives when he can adapt the agents'bene…t from promotion. Similar to the single task model there will never be equilibria in which the responsibility for one task is divided among the two agents. Again incentives can only created with the "sole and undivided responsibility of one man"for one task.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the simple model.
In the subsequent section 3 we analyze how the promotion decision is made by the principal. After this, the possible equilibria of the game are characterized in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 consider the incentive and the learning aspect of responsibility. Finally in section 7 an extension of the model on multiple tasks is studied.
The Model
We consider the following simple model. A principal employs two agents The output of the task accrues to the principal and is given by the sum of the individual contributions
Hence, the ability of an agent determines the marginal productivity of his e¤ort. The higher his ability, the more productive is a given amount of e¤ort exerted by an agent. The principal only observes the total output and not the individual contributions.
In the second period one of the two agents gets promoted to a better job by the principal. The principal cares for having the better agent promoted but she cannot commit to a promotion policy in advance. For simplicity we assume that the principal's payo¤ from the promotion decision is a linear 6 function of the ability of the agent who is promoted, i.e. in expected terms her second period output is E [R i jy] where R is a given constant. The agent who is promoted receives a bene…t B from promotion, which may simply be the wage di¤erential between the old and the new job. In most of the paper we treat B as exogenously given and do not consider endogenous wage setting.
As for instance Waldman (1984) and in a tournament framework Zabojník and Bernhardt (2001) have laid out, wage increases due to promotions are to a large extent beyond a …rm's control as a promotion signals a high worker productivity to other employers whose external wage o¤ers have the to be matched by the current employer. 4 We further discuss the endogenization of B in the last section.
The Promotion Decision
We look for pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of the model described above. First, the optimal promotion decision in period 2 is analyzed as the principal's reaction function given the principal's beliefs on the agents'equilibrium e¤ort levels dentoted by a 1 and a 2 . In the next section we will then derive the agent's equilibrium e¤ort choices given this promotion strategy.
Of course, the principal wants to promote the agent with the higher expected ability, i.e. agent i is always promoted if
after the principal has observed the actual output y. The principal is indi¤erent, whom to promote when
Due to the normality assumption the expected ability of agent i is given by
for strategies a 1 and a 2 chosen by the agents. Note that although she cannot observe the e¤ort levels, the principal infers a 1 and a 2 in a pure strategy equilibrium. The principal adapts her beliefs on the ability of each agent after she has observed the outcome of the task y by taking into account the 7 equilibrium strategies played by the agents in the …rst period. If the task is completed successfully and the outcome is higher than the expected outcome given the principal's beliefs on the agents'contributions (i.e. y > E [y]), the reputation of both agents raises above the prior level, otherwise it decreases.
The strength of the adaptation depends on the respective e¤ort contributions of both agents and the precision of the knowledge on their abilities.
Comparing both agents, note that if a i 2 i > a j 2 j then the beliefs on the ability of agent i are adapted to a stronger extent than those on agent j. In particular, if the initial beliefs on the abilities are identical the adaptation is stronger for the agent with the larger presumed contribution.
Applying those considerations we can derive the principal's optimal second period promotion decision given the agent's equilibrium actions.
Lemma 1 Suppose that in equilibrium
In that case agent i is promoted if the realized pro…t exceeds a certain performance standard y T , which is given by
Furthermore, if the initial beliefs on the agent's abilities are identical, agent i will be promoted if pro…ts are larger than the initially expected pro…ts.
If however, in equilibrium 2 i a i = 2 j a j the principal will always promote the agent with the higher initially expected ability.
Proof: See Appendix.
If initial beliefs on both agents are identical -for instance because both are new to the organization -the agent with the higher equilibrium e¤ort is promoted if and only if pro…ts are higher than expected pro…ts. As we have seen above, both agents'reputation is always adapted in the same direction if they both contribute positive e¤ort levels. A higher than expected outcome increases the principal's beliefs on both agents'abilities, a lower than expected outcomes reduces those beliefs. But in addition, the adaptation of beliefs is stronger for the agent with the higher presumed contribution. If, however, agent i is initially believed to be more able than his colleague (i.e. m i > m j ), his pro…t target is lower than the initially expected pro…t.
It takes a comparatively worse result to edge him out and this "discount"is larger, the larger the initial ability di¤erence.
Responsibility and Incentives
Given the optimal promotion decision by the principal, we can now analyze the equilibrium e¤ort levels exerted by the agents. The agent's decisions must be best responses given the principal's beliefs on the e¤ort contributions by the agents and her promotion strategy in period 2. Now it is important to distinguish between actual e¤ort levels and the principal's beliefs. We denote those beliefs on the agent's actions byâ i andâ j and the expected output for given beliefs byŷ. It is important to note that the principal makes his promotion decision based on these beliefs. Hence, the threshold for promotion from the agent's view in the …rst period will be based on this beliefs:
The agents anticipate that agent i will be promoted when the actual output y = i a i + j a j exceeds this threshold. Although the beliefs will of course be correct in equilibrium, we have to consider the agents'possible deviations.
First, suppose that the principal's beliefs are such that for one agent i conditionâ i 2 i >â j 2 j holds. Agent j will then be promoted only if pro…ts are smaller than a certain cut-o¤ value. Hence, the best he can do is to exert no e¤ort at all. A good outcome of the task will always increase his colleague's reputation to a larger extent than his own. Hence, it is straightforward that in any equilibrium withâ i 2 i >â j 2 j we must have that a j = 0. In that case, agent i bears sole responsibility for the task. It is only him, who contributes to the task. Hence, only the beliefs on his talent are adapted according to the outcome of the task. According to Lemma 1, he will then 9 be promoted if the outcome of the task exceeds
Hence, the agent has to beat a performance standard, determined by the product of his own conjectured contribution and his colleague's expected ability. To understand the value of the standard, just think of the principal asking the following hypothetical question: "Given my initial beliefs, which pro…t would agent j attain in expected terms if he exerted the same e¤ort level that I think agent i has exerted?". If the pro…t generated by i exceeds this value, then agent i will be promoted otherwise j is preferred. In period 1 agent i then maximizes the following expression, given the principal's equilibrium beliefs:
If there is a unique solution to this problem with a positive a i =â i we have an equilibrium. Indeed, if the uncertainty on agent i's ability is not too small, such an equilibrium exists as is shown in the following result:
6 Proposition 1 For each agent i, if i is su¢ ciently large there exist a"sole responsibility" equilibrium, in which agent i contributes a strictly positive e¤ort level a i , determined by
and the other agent supplies no e¤ort at all (a j = 0). The principal will promote agent i if the outcome exceeds the expected outcome when j instead
To understand why we can show the existence of such an equilibrium only if the variance of the agent's ability is large just note that if it is zero the principal knows the agent's abilities perfectly and the outcome of the task will not a¤ect her beliefs. There must be some uncertainty on the agent's abilities such that they indeed have an interest to demonstrate their respective abilities by exerting a high e¤ort level.
It is interesting to note that if we would allow for sabotage as for instance in the tournament model by Lazear (1989) , then the agent j would have an incentive to use this possibility and destroy the output produced by agent i as this raises his own career prospects. Now suppose that we have an equilibrium whereâ i 2 i =â j 2 j . In that case the principal cannot learn from the realized pro…t as we know from Lemma 1. If in that case the initially expected abilities di¤er, the agent with the higher expected ability will always be promoted. But then neither the more, nor the less able agent has any incentive to exert e¤ort. Hence, if expected abilities di¤er we must have that a i = a j = 0 whenever a i 2 i = a j 2 j and no agent exerts e¤ort in equilibrium. If the initially expected abilities coincide the principal is indi¤erent between promoting each of the agents.
Hence, she may apply an arbitrary promotion strategy in this case. When the promotion strategy does not condition on the observed output, we again obtain an equilibrium in which indeed no agent exerts e¤ort. But in addition, we show in the subsequent result, that even with an arbitrary promotion strategy conditional on output there is no equilibrium, in which both agents exert positive e¤ort levels:
Proposition 2 There is always a "no responsibility" equilibrium in which no agent exerts any e¤ort. If the expected abilities of the agents di¤er, the agent with the higher expected ability is always promoted. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium in which both agents exert positive e¤ort levels.
Hence, there is either a situation in which exactly one of the agents is responsible for the task or a situation without any responsibility. But in the latter case no agent contributes to the success of the task, as no one can gain anything relative to his colleague in the promotion tournament.
From now on we assume that both i and j are su¢ ciently large such that the two sole responsibility equilibria indeed exist as we want to compare the two possible equilibria.
7 Furthermore, we suppose that the principal can choose among the mentioned equilibria by holding one of the agents responsible for the task. It is implicit in this assumption that the players can coordinate on one equilibrium by some form of cheap talk by the principal.
The principal can make an announcement like "I hold agent i responsible for the task" before the game starts which corresponds in our model to an announcement "I will promote agent i if the output is larger than e i m j ".
Note that if an announcement is consistent with one of the possible equilibrium promotion strategies, the principal will indeed have an incentive to do what she announced given that the agents believe its content: By definition of the equilibrium, in these three cases the principal will optimally follow the announcement given that the agent's play a best response to the announced strategy. As laid out in the introduction, each of those messages is therefore self-comitting in the sense of Farrell and Rabin (1996) .
For our purpose, it seems appropriate to check which equilibrium (and therefore which of the self-committing announcements) generates the highest pro…ts for the principal. It is straightforward, that this cannot be the no responsibility equilibrium. Hence, we will examine which of the two agents should be held responsible for the task.
Who works harder?
To answer this question we have to compare the two sole responsibility equilibria. First, we suppose that both agents have di¤erent prior expected ability levels, but that the information on both agents is equally precise (i.e.
. Without loss of generality we assume that i is the agent with the higher expected ability, i.e. m i > m j . The di¤erence in abilities is denoted by m = m i m j :
As (:) is symmetric it can be seen from equation (3) that for a given di¤erence in abilities m the e¤ort of the responsible agent is the higher the higher his colleague's ability. Hence, the agent with the lower ability works harder if he is held responsible than his colleague with a higher expected ability in the same situation! However, it is less clear how the total output is a¤ected as the more able agent has a higher marginal product of output. This is examined in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the information on both agents'abilities is equally precise. Then the agent with the lower expected ability contributes more e¤ort when he is responsible than the agent with the higher expected ability.
However, the total expected outcome is higher when the more able agent is responsible.
To understand the result that the agent with the lower expected ability will supply a higher e¤ort level, note that the optimal promotion rule by the principal yields a threshold value for the generated pro…ts such that the responsible agent is promoted if and only if pro…ts are higher than this value.
But the threshold value is determined by the expected ability of the agent who is not responsible. For the more able agent it is easier to attain this value than for the less able agent for two reasons: …rst, the threshold is lower and in addition his marginal product of e¤ort is higher such that it easier for him to attain the threshold with a su¢ ciently high probability.
Still, the more able agent produces a higher expected total output with a given e¤ort level as he has a higher marginal product of e¤ort. As the result shows, for this reason the total output of the more able agent will be higher although he exerts less e¤ort. Hence, for equal precisions the principal prefers that the more able agent is held responsible and works for the task.
After having considered the case where the expectations on the agents' abilities di¤er but are equally precise, it seems interesting to examine the polar case, where the expected abilities coincide, but the precisions di¤er.
For m = 0 equation (3) yields
The left hand side is decreasing in the variance. Hence, it can directly be seen that the agent with the more precise signal will exert a higher equilibrium e¤ort if he is held responsible for the task. As the expected marginal product is the same for both agents this directly implies that the expected output must be higher if this agent is held responsible.
To understand this observation note that the marginal product of e¤ort in equilibrium (at a i =â i ) is larger for an agent with a smaller variance:
To see that, consider equation (2) and note that for m i = m j the marginal product of e¤ort is determined by the density of a normal distribution at its mean at a i =â i . But the density at the mean is higher the lower the variance. On a less technical level, when less is known on the agent's ability and therefore on his marginal product of e¤ort, there is a higher variance of the possible outcome for a given e¤ort level. Hence, the impact of e¤ort on the outcome of the tournament is weak relative to the impact of chance.
Therefore exerting e¤ort is less attractive for an agent who is less sure on his ability than for an agent who knows his productivity more precisely. This result is related to a typical result from the tournament literature where for a given prize spread the equilibrium e¤ort is higher the lower the variance of the noise terms.
We can summarize those considerations in the following result:
Proposition 4 If both agents have the same expected ability but di¤er in the precision with which the respective abilities are known, the agent with the more precisely known ability exerts more e¤ort and produces a higher output.
So far we have only considered the impact of responsibility on the current output. But contrary to typical career concerns models where future returns accrue to the agent due to a perfectly competitive labor market, in our model the …rm also cares for promoting the better agent. As we will see in the next section this learning purpose is also important to …gure out who should best be held responsible for carrying out the task.
14 6 How to learn most?
If an agent's career goes on within the same organization, it will of course be important to promote the agent with the higher expected ability. Recall the assumption, that when promoting an agent with expected ability E [ i jy] the principal receives a payo¤ of E [R i jy]. First, we consider a situation where the principal only cares for this second period payo¤ to isolate the learning e¤ects from the incentive e¤ects of allocation responsibility.
Note that the …rm learns nothing on the agent who is not responsible.
Hence, the interesting question is from which agent the …rm can learn more to make an appropriate promotion decision. Suppose that agent i was responsible for carrying out the task and a pro…t of y i has been realized. As we have seen, the …rm will promote agent i if E [ i jy i ] > m j . In that case, the …rm's return on the second stage is R max fE [ i jy i ] ; m j g. The prior expectation of the …rm's pro…ts on the second stage when holding agent i responsible for the task are therefore given by
This can be reformulated using equation (1), the expressions for y and E [y]
and the fact that a j = 0 if agent i is held responsible for carrying out the task:
If the …rm only cares for second period pro…ts, she will assign responsibility to agent i instead of agent j if
By computing those two expressions and comparing them, we obtain the following clear-cut result:
Proposition 5 If the principal only cares to promote the better agent, she should allocate responsibility to the agent whose ability is less certain regardless of the agents'expected abilities.
Hence, if she only cares for learning about the agents'abilities the principal should hold the agent responsible on whose ability less is known, whatever the initially expected abilities of both. It is this agent, on which there is more to learn. 8 To understand this result suppose that agent i was held responsible for the task. Note that after having observed the outcome the principal can always promote agent j and receive an expected return of R m j . She will promote agent i only if his posterior expected ability exceeds m j . If the uncertainty on i's ability is higher, so will be the prior variance of E [ i jy i ].
But then the "option value" of such an agent is higher for the principal as there is more weight in the upper tail of the distribution.
In a certain sense, it is bene…cial to assign responsibility to the less precisely known agent simply as there is more to learn on him than on his colleague. Note that this result holds whatever the prior expected abilities are. Now consider the case where both agents have equal prior expected abilities but di¤er in the precision with which those abilities are known. Note that in this case the result of Proposition 5 contrasts that of Proposition 4 as when considering the incentive aspect the agent with the more precisely known ability should be promoted, but when only taking the learning aspect into account the contrary is true. A direct implication is the following result:
Corollary 1 If the agents'expected abilities are identical, the principal should assign responsibility to the agent with the more precisely known ability if the importance of the future task R is su¢ ciently small, otherwise she should assign responsibility to the agent with the less precisely known ability.
Hence, if it is su¢ ciently important to promote the better quali…ed agent, then the principal should assign responsibility to the agent whose ability is less well known.
Multiple Tasks
Note that in the model of the previous section, in any equilibrium at least one of the agents is always idle. This is clearly ine¢ cient as the marginal costs of e¤ort are zero for this agent when exerting more e¤ort. However, if there will be more tasks, we can show that this ine¢ ciency disappears.
We therefore extend the model to encompass the case of multiple tasks.
In the …rst period each agent i can now exert e¤orts a iA and a iB on two separate tasks A and B. Both agents have an identical convex cost function c (a iA + a iB ). Note that we assume that an agent's e¤orts for the two tasks are perefctly substitutable in his cost function. For simplicity we consider a symmetric situation and therefore assume that the prior expectations on the agents'abilities are identical and, hence, i N m; 2 for i = 1; 2:
The outcome of task t is now given by
Hence, if both agents exert e¤ort for both tasks, the principal has two signals on the talent of each agent. As before, she will promote the agent with the higher expected ability, i.e. agent i is always promoted if
Hence, the vector of outputs y = A . We can now compute the conditional expectation of given the observed outputs y. The covariance matrix of y is given by V ar [y] = AV ar [ ] A 0 . We now have to distinguish two cases, depending on whether V ar [y] is invertible for given equilibrium e¤ort levels, which is the case if and only if A is nonsingular or a iA a jB a jA a iB 6 = 0.
In the …rst case a iA a jB = a jA a iB such that the e¤ort vectors are linear dependent. Then either y A and y B contain the same information or at most one of them contains information on 1 and 2 . When furthermore a iA = a jA and a jB = a jB then the principal cannot learn anything from the outcome.
By the same logic as in Section 4 the only feasible equilibrium in this case will be a no-responsibility equilibrium with a iA = a jB = a jA = a iB = 0.
When only a iA > 0 and a jA = a iB = a jB = 0 then the principal cannot learn anything on B's ability and A works only on a single task. We are then back in the case of the previous section and we can again …nd an equilibrium characterized by equation 3.
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When neither of this is the case we can proceed with equation (1) and obtain
Hence, i is promoted whenever
When a iA > a jA then agent i is promoted whenever y A > E [y A ]. Hence, at stage 1 we will always have that a jA = 0 in this case. But note that as a iA a jB = a jA a iB ; this implies that a iB > a jB and thus a jB = 0. Hence, if a iA a jB = a jA a iB it can only be the case that one of both agents works for both tasks whereas the other one does not exert e¤ort for either of the tasks.
Indeed, we can show that such equilibria exist:
Proposition 6 There is a continuum of equilibria in which only one of the agents is responsible for both tasks. The responsible agent i will choose a iA and a iB such that a iA + a iB = a i where a i is de…ned by
These equilibria exist if i is su¢ ciently large. Furthermore, there is always a "no responsibility" equilibrium in which no agent exerts e¤ort on any of the tasks.
Note that the e¤ort exerted by the responsible agent on both tasks exactly coincides with the e¤ort exerted in a sole responsibility equilibrium in the single task model. Hence, in the equilibria characterized so far the total e¤ort exerted will never exceed that in the single task model.
In the second case a Ai a Bj a Aj a Bi 6 = 0 and the matrix A is nonsingular.
Now we can directly compute
From this expression we can derive the principal's beliefs on the agents's respective abilities after he has observed the outcome of both tasks
Hence, agent i is promoted whenever . Hence, agent i spends a higher fraction of his total e¤ort on task A than his colleague and vice versa j spends a higher fraction of his e¤ort on task B. Let the equilibrium e¤ort levels beâ iA ,â iB ,â jA ,â jB and letŷ A andŷ B be the expected outcomes of respective tasks given these beliefs. Then i is promoted when
It is important to note, that an agent can raise his probability of being promoted by increasing the outcome of the task, on which he is believed to exert a relatively higher fraction of his total e¤ort. Conversely, he lowers the probability of promotion when he raises his e¤ort level for the task on which he is believed to exert the lower fraction of the total e¤ort. From these considerations it is straightforward to see that in any equilibrium a iB = 0 and a jA = 0 whenever a iA a jB > a jA a iB . Agent i is therefore promoted when
Hence, agent i's equilibrium strategy on stage 1 is characterized by
By solving this optimization problem we can characterize pure strategy equilibria of the game:
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Proposition 7 In any pure strategy equilibrium in which both agents exert positive e¤ort levels, each agent is held responsible and works only for one of the tasks and both work for di¤erent tasks. If agent 1 is responsible for task A and agent 2 for task B; then the equilibrium e¤ort levels are characterized by a jA = a iB = 0 and
It is important to note, that there is no equilibrium in this model, in which both agents exert e¤ort for the same task and therefore the responsibility for a single task will never be divided among two agents.
However, responsibility may well be divided for separate tasks. As we have seen, there may well be equilibria in which each agent is held responsible for a separate task. When the principal believes that agent i works harder for task A and agent j works harder for task B then, it is agent i's reputation that 20 su¤ers, when the outcome of task A is low and analogously j 0 s reputation when the same happens with the outcome of task B. Both agents then compete in a tournament and each of them has a strong incentive to work hard to lead his own task to a success.
Clearly, the equilibrium in which the two agents are responsible for separate tasks is opimal from a learning perspective. Only in this equilibrium the principal gets a signal on each agent's ability. Moreover, as the principal knows the equilibrium e¤ort levels he can infer the abilities perfectly and will always promote the agent with the higher ability. This is not the case, if one agent is responsible for both tasks.
Proposition 7 has an additional important consequence: We can now get both agents to work and neither of them is idle when each is held responsible for a separate task. Indeed, we can show that for many cases the total e¤ort exerted is larger when each agent is responisble for a task than when one agent is responsible for both:
Corollary 2 When c 000 (a) 0 then the total e¤ort exerted on both tasks will always be larger when each agent is held responsible for a separate task than when one agent is responsible for both tasks.
Finally, note that if the principal could endogenously determine the bene…t of promotion B for instance by adapting the wage structure of the organization she may even be able to implement …rst best e¤ort levels. For instance, consider the case where the principal's revenue from the e¤orts on the two tasks is = (a iA + a jA ) + (a iB + a jB ) ; where is some strictly concave function. Note that in any …rst best optimal solution both agents will then exert the same e¤ort level and the e¤orts exerted for both tasks are the same.
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Furthermore, …rst best pro…ts can then be attained when a iA = a jB > 0 and a jA = a iB = 0. Then, …rst best e¤ort levels a F B = a Note that …rst-best e¤ort levels can of course neither be attained in the no responsibility equilibrium nor when one agent is responsible for both tasks.
Only, when each agent is held responsible for a separate task appropriate incentives are induced. This result is related to a result by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) . They analyze a linear hidden action model in which two agents can work for several tasks and in which-as in our model-the e¤orts an agent spends on the tasks are perfectly substitutable in his cost function.
They obtain the result that it is never optimal for the two agents to be rewarded for the outcome of the same task. Hence, as in our model the two agents optimally work for separate tasks. Note that in their model the allocation of tasks consists in the design of a formal incentive contract. Here the allocation of responsibility arises as an equilibrium outcome in a game where agents care for their career prospects.
Conclusion
We have provided a simple model to clarify the notion of responsibility in a multiagent career concerns framework. In the single task model we have shown that two types of equilibria may exist. Either no agent bears responsibility and, hence, no agent contributes e¤ort to the task or there are sole responsibility equilibria in which exactly one agent contributes e¤ort to the task and hence, the principal's beliefs on this agent's ability is adapted according to the outcome of the task.
The principal is of course always better o¤ with a sole responsibility equilibrium, as then one agent has an incentive to exert e¤ort on the task.
This yields a simple formal explanation for the commonly felt principle that responsibility for a certain task should be allocated to one person as for instance stated in the phrase by Alexander Hamilton cited in beginning of the paper: "The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation".
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We have then analyzed, which agent should be responsible for a given task if the agents di¤er in their abilities or the precision with which those abilities are known. Two aspects have been identi…ed in our model, which are important for assigning responsibility. On the one hand, the principal has to consider which agent works harder, when being responsible for the task and which agent attains a higher expected output. On the other hand, she has to bear in mind that the assignment of responsibility generates information as she learns more about the ability of the responsible agent and this in turn is valuable as it helps to improve the promotion decision.
Finally, we have shown that …rst-best optimal incentives can be induced when there are several tasks. It is important to understand that e¢ ciency can only be attained when holding the agents responsible for separate tasks. It is neither possible when no agent is responsible for a task, as then incentives are destroyed entirely, nor when one agent is responsible for both tasks.
Hence, only a combination of an undivided responsibility for each task and the division of labor across tasks creates high powered incentives.
Appendix
Calculation of expression (1):
We know that for normally distributed random variables the following equation holds:
Applying this, we obtain
Proof of Lemma 1:
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The principal will promote agent i i¤
Proof of Proposition 1: Agent i's expected utility is determined by the probability of being promoted:
If a i = 0 andâ i > 0 this probability of being promoted is zero. The agent gets zero utility. If a i > 0; we can reformulate (6) and obtain:
where
Hence,
and the maximization problem is given by:
24
The …rst order condition is
Hence, if a pure strategy equilibrium with a i > 0 exists we must have that
where m = m j m i . This equation yields a unique strictly positive value for a i as a possible equilibrium strategy. Note that the …rst order condition is necessary but not su¢ cient as the objective function (8) will in general not be concave. Hence, we have to check that choosingâ is indeed a global maximum for given beliefsâ. First, we compute the second derivative of the expected payo¤ from promotion, which is
Note that there is a unique in ‡ection point at:
The payo¤ from promotion is strictly convex below a IP and strictly concave above. Atâ i the second derivative is negative i¤ (m j m i ) m j 2 i 2 < 0 which is always the case if i is su¢ ciently large. Hence, for large values of the variance,â i > a IP andâ i is the unique local maximum above a IP .
If the global maximum would to be the left ofâ i the agents payo¤ in such a global maximum is bounded from above by the gross payo¤ from promotion at the in ‡ection point (as the winning probability is increasing in a) 0
A su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium is therefore that the agent's utility atâ i = a i which is given by
exceeds (10). Both functions are continuous in i . Note from (9) that a i is strictly decreasing in i if i is large enough as
and it converges to zero for i ! 1. Hence, expression (11) tends to B 2 as i approaches in…nity. But the limit of the upper boundary (10) can be computed as
which is smaller than
. Hence, for su¢ ciently large i the unique global maximizer isâ i and the equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 2:
If 2 i a i = 2 j a j and m i = m j the principal is indi¤erent on whom to promote. She can choose an arbitrary promotion strategy p i (y) where this denotes the probability of promoting agent i (and therefore p j (y) = 1 p i (y)). Suppose that there is an equilibrium with a i > 0 and a j > 0 in this case. First, we show that for any equilibrium there will be two separate unilateral deviations by the two agents which lead to the same outcome distribution. Then we show that it can never be the case that both deviations are unpro…table. 
We have to distinguish two cases: But if a i and a j are chosen in equilibrium, we must have that
which are equivalent to 
Proof of Proposition 3:
The expected pro…t if agent i (j) is held responsible is a i m i (a j m j ). We know that for i = j = ,
27 which are equivalent to
As we have seen this is the case i¤ m i > m j .
Proof of Proposition 5:
By adapting a result from Gourieroux and Monfort (1989) Using that 0 (x) = x (x) this expression is simply equal to m > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
As we have seen, when only a iA > 0 we can proceeed as in the proof of Proposition 1 and obtain 4. When a iA ; a iB > 0 we must have that y A =â iÂ a iB y B as y A =â iA i and y B =â iB i on the equilibrium path .We specify the out-ofequilibrium beliefs such that the principal will always believe that the other agent j has a higher ability whenever this is not the case. Let (a) = a c 0 (a). When c 000 (a) 0 then (a) is strictly convex as 00 (a) = 2c 00 (a) + ac 000 (a) > 0. Hence, 1 (x) is strictly concave and monotonically increasing. Let the total e¤ort when only one agent is responsible for both tasks be a O and when the two agents are responsible each for one of the tasks be a T . Then from Propositions 6 and 7 we get that
But then we have that
where the …rst inequality follows from the monotonicity and the second from the strict concavity of 1 (x).
